Nationalization, De-Nationalization, Re-Nationalization: Some Historical and Comparative Perspective by Edwards, Mark A.
Pace Law Review
Volume 30
Issue 1 Fall 2009
Real Property, Mortgages, and the Economy: A Call for
Ethics and Reforms
Article 16
September 2009
Nationalization, De-Nationalization, Re-
Nationalization: Some Historical and Comparative
Perspective
Mark A. Edwards
William Mitchell College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mark A. Edwards, Nationalization, De-Nationalization, Re-Nationalization: Some Historical and
Comparative Perspective, 30 Pace L. Rev. 124 (2009)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/16
 124 
FLAWED REGULATORY POLICY: 
THE FUTURE OF FANNIE AND 
FREDDIE 
 
 
Nationalization,  
De-­Nationalization,  
Re-­Nationalization: Some 
Historical and Comparative 
Perspective 
 
Mark A. Edwards* 
 
Introduction 
 
Banks, savings banks, insurance companies . . . 
because of their great needs, were foreclosing 
mortgages, calling loans, refusing credit.  . . . We 
were faced by a condition and not a theory. . . . It 
was clear that mere appeals from Washington for 
confidence and the mere lending of more money 
to shaky institutions could not stop this 
downward course.  A prompt program applied as 
quickly as possible seemed to me not only 
justified but imperative to our national security.1 
 
The quote above might have come from President Obama, 
explaining his recently enacted fiscal stimulus bill,2 but it did 
not.  It came from Franklin Roosevelt during his second 
´ILUHVLGHFKDWµUDGLRDGGUHVVRQ0D\7KDWLWVHHPVVR
apt today may be startling, but it should not be.  As this Article 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. 
1. Franklin D. Roosevelt, U.S. President, Fireside Chat on Banking 
Crisis (May 7, 1933), available at http://www.mhric.org/fdr/chat2.html. 
2. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-­5, 123 
Stat. 115 (2009) (signed by President Obama on February 17, 2009). 
1
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argues, we have been down this road before several times and 
are likely to go down it several more times in the future. 
It is difficult to remember it now, but there was once a 
time, not so long ago, when the economic crisis now engulfing 
WKHZRUOGZDVNQRZQDV´WKHVXESULPHPRUWJDJHFULVLVµ3  That 
description of the crisis now seems about as apt as calling the 
&KHUQRE\OGLVDVWHU´WKHVWXFNFRROLQJURGLQFLGHQWµDFFXUDWHLQ
its way, but missing some rather important details about the 
chain reaction that followed.4  What started as a domestic 
problem with irrational lending secured by obscure mortgage 
instruments5 has spread with such force and power that the 
most powerful banks in the world,6 not to mention several 
nations,7 stand on the brink of economic collapse. 
It is inevitable, therefore, that the scope of analysis of 
what went wrong must expand with the crisis.  But it is also 
appropriate to remind ourselves that this mess started with the 
seemingly mundane act of buying houses.  Particularly in the 
United States, lending and housing are bound together;; 
difficulties in one mean difficulties in the other.  And, because 
housing is particularly bound up with the idea of ´WKH
$PHULFDQGUHDPµD FULVLV LQEDQNLQJPD\XQLTXHO\FKDOOHQJH
the American sense of self-­identity. 
The difficulty of memory haunts this crisis in other ways 
as well.  The failure of policy-­makers to remember history is a 
direct cause of their inability to come to terms with the crisis.  
One goal of this Article is to address the history of the 
relationship between societies and their lending institutions, 
 
3. See Senate OKs Bill to Ease Homeowners in Crisis, MSNBC, Dec. 14, 
 KWWSZZZPVQEFPVQFRPLG ´7KH OHJLVODWLRQ DSSURYHG
93-­1, is the Senate's first attempt to deal with the looming subprime 
PRUWJDJHFULVLVµ 
4. See GRIGORI MEDVEDEV, THE TRUTH ABOUT CHERNOBYL 73-­91 (Evelyn 
Rossiter trans., Basic Books, Inc. 1991) (1989), for an overview of the 
Chernobyl disaster. 
5. Danielle DiMartino & John V. Duca, The Rise and Fall of Subprime 
Mortgages, ECON. LETTER, Nov. 2007, available at 
http://www.dallasfed.org/research/eclett/2007/el0711.pdf. 
6. See, e.g., Neil Irwin & David Cho, A New Architecture for the 
Financial World, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2008, at A01 (noting the imminent 
collapses of major banks). 
7. See, e.g., Daniel Gros, Iceland on the Brink? Options for a Small, 
Financially Active Economy in the Current Financial Crisis Environment, 
CENTER FOR EUR. POL·Y STUD., Apr. 2008. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/16
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and, in particular, the central role of housing in that 
relationship.  Like many social relationships, the relationship 
between housing, banking, and society has been defined, 
imperfectly, by law. 
When I proposed this Article topic to the editors of this 
symposium, it was a little extreme to speak of nationalization, 
at least as that term is commonly defined in the popular 
imagination.  No more.  A survey of headlines from the news 
sources8 for the past months makes the point: increasingly, 
popular discourse has begun to grapple with a concept that 
seems³but, as I argue below, only seems³unprecedented in 
the history (and antithetical to the ideology) of our capitalist 
economy. 
Part I of this Article reviews the long and tumultuous 
history of nationalization, de-­nationalization, and re-­
nationalization of the financial and housing finance industries 
in the United States, from their earliest days to the present.  
That review leads to two conclusions.  FLUVW´QDWLRQDOL]DWLRQµLV
a weak description, at best, which encompasses a wide range of 
government interactions with private industry.  While the 
degree of intervention fluctuates through time in response to 
various crises, it is useful to recognize that it is almost never 
accurate to characterize financial and housing finance 
industries as either fully nationalized or fully de-­nationalized.  
Second, extensive government intervention in those industries 
in the United States has occurred repeatedly. 
Part II briefly examines the policy responses to the current 
crisis from both the Bush and Obama administrations.  Part III 
examines the relationship between the financial and housing 
finance industries in several other countries with diverse 
 
8. Edmund L. Andrews, Rescue of U.S. Banks Hints at Nationalization, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2009, at B1;; Bank Nationalization Speculation Prompts 
Confusion, Fear, CNN MONEY, Feb. 20, 2009;; Editorial, Nationalizing the 
Bank Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2009, available at http:// 
roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/01/22/nationalizing-­the-­bank-­
problem/;; Neil Irwin & David Cho, A New Architecture for the Financial 
World, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2008, at A01;; Paul Krugman, Opinion, Banking 
on the Brink, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2009, at A27;; Gretchen Morgenson, The End 
of Banking as We Know It, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2009, at BU1;; David E. 
Sanger, Nationalization Gets a New, Serious Look, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2009, 
at A1;; Mike Soraghan, Bank Nationalization Attracts GOP Support, THE 
HILL, Feb. 15, 2009, available at http://thehill.com/leading-­the-­news/once-­
radical-­nationalization-­attracts-­gop-­support-­2009-­02-­15.html. 
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histories and systems of government.  It reveals surprisingly 
similar patterns of government intervention in the industries 
across diverse political and economic systems.  Part IV 
attempts to fashion a single explanation for both the strange 
history of banking and housing finance nationalization in the 
United States and the surprisingly similar histories of 
nationalization of those industries in diverse political and 
economic systems.  This part also speculates on the future of 
the relationship between instruments of housing finance³
specifically Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac³and the Federal 
Government. 
 
I. De-­Nationalization and Re-­Nationalization of the 
Banking and Housing Finance Industries in the United 
States 
 
The history of banking in the United States is really the 
history of competing impulses, one motivated by ideology, the 
other by pragmatism.  Two ideological strains have combined 
to make the United States ever reluctant to embrace centrally 
planned intervention in the financial industries: the preference 
for federalism9 and the preference for relatively laissez-­faire 
capitalism.10  Against these impulses, pragmatic responses to 
crises have led repeatedly to attempts at centrally planned 
regulatory intervention into lending.  It is this dynamic that 
has produced a tumultuous and even schizophrenic 
relationship between American society and its banks.  The 
difficulties of this relationship are especially acute with regard 
to housing finance. 
 
A. Nationalization: The First Bank of the United States 
 
To begin at the beginning: at the urging of Alexander 
Hamilton, and with considerable opposition from opponents of 
 
9. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Elastic 
Commerce Clause: A Political Theory of American Federalism, 47 VAND. L. 
REV. 1355 (1994);; Harry N. Scheiber, Redesigning the Architecture of 
Federalism ² An American Tradition: Modern Devolution Policies in 
Perspective, 14 YALE L. & POL·Y REV. 227 (1996). 
10. See generally THE STATE AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (Harry N. 
Schreiber ed., 1998). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/16
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federal power, led prominently by Thomas Jefferson, the First 
Bank of the United States was chartered in 1791.11  Jefferson 
was deeply suspicious that a national bank in general³and 
Hamilton in particular³would be tempted to amass power.12 
7KH %DQN·V ODUJHVW VKDUHKROGHU ZDV WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV
which held a 20% interest.13  The Bank played an important 
role in financing the Federal Government, but it was 
considerably less important to the economic life of the country 
than were the numerous banks chartered in the individual 
states.14  Those banks issued their own notes, which became 
the bulk of the United States money supply.15  Opposition from 
states-­rights advocates led to the dissolution of the National 
Bank when its first twenty-­year charter expired.16 
 
B. De-­Nationalization: Washington is Burning 
 
A year later, in 1812, a crisis that makes the current one 
look relatively trivial caused the nation to reconsider its 
distaste for central banking.  The United States found itself in 
a war in which Washington itself was burned to the ground by 
an invading army.17  That happened in part because the 
Federal Government had no easy way to borrow money to 
finance a war effort.18  Moreover, the unregulated state and 
private banks were of no help;; they turned out to be issuing 
notes without sufficient reserves to cover them.19 
 
C. Re-­Nationalization: The Second Bank of the United States 
 
By 1816, the Second National Bank of the United States 
 
11. See, e.g., JOHN STEELE GORDON, AN EMPIRE OF WEALTH 78-­79 (2004). 
12. Id. 
13. EDWARD S. KAPLAN, THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
AMERICAN ECONOMY ix (1999). 
14. Warren E. Weber, Early State Banks in the United States: How 
Many were There and Where did they Exist?, 30 FED. RES. BANK OF MINN. Q. 
REV. 28 (Sept. 2006). 
15. See KAPLAN, supra note 13, at 27. 
16. Id. at 32-­33. 
17. See generally JOHN K. MAHON, WAR OF 1812 (1991). 
18. See KAPLAN, supra note 13, at 38. 
19. Id. at 38-­43. 
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was born of necessity.20  Moreover, the first federal attempts to 
intervene in the management of the banking industry resulted 
in tighter restrictions on the ability of state and private banks 
to issue notes.21  By 1816, the relationship between the United 
States and its banks had already assumed some of the 
character it retains today: ideological preferences for weak 
federal power giving way to the necessity of greater regulation 
in response to a crisis. 
 
D. De-­Nationalization: The Free Banking / Intermittent Panic 
Years 
 
The Second National Bank, like the First, did its job well 
enough that it soon put itself out of business.22  Stability 
returned to the financial system,23 and the apparent need for 
an ideologically offensive central federal banking authority 
melted away with the crisis it had corrected.  Indeed, it was 
during this period that the first depositor insurance system 
was enacted in New York, protecting deposits in the event of 
bank failure through an assessment on banks.24  State banks 
were sound again, and ideological preference against central 
authority was no longer an unaffordable luxury.  In 1836, the 
Second Bank died, like the First, at the age of twenty.25 
For the next thirty-­five years, the United States did 
without either a central planning authority or significant 
federal regulatory oversight of private banks.26  All banks were 
chartered by the states, largely under their own changing 
standards.27  Almost immediately after the Second Bank was 
dissolved, the country suffered a banking crisis, known as the 
Panic of 1837.28  State banks failed and state governments 
 
20. Id. at 49-­55;; see also Hugh Rockoff, Banking and Finance, 1789-­
1914, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: THE 
LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY, at 643, 647-­49 (Stanley L. Engerman & Robert 
E. Gallman eds., 2000). 
21. See KAPLAN, supra note 13, at 69-­70. 
22. Id. at 160. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. See, e.g., GORDON, supra note 11, at 113-­31. 
27. See, e.g., id. at 122. 
28. See id. at 130. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/16
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defaulted on their debts.29  Foreign investment in the United 
States suffered, and the economy did not recover for several 
years.30  Nonetheless, the ideological preference for de-­
centralized economic authority was strong enough that the 
national bank was not revived. 
In the ensuing years, until the Civil War forever re-­wrote 
the relationship between the states and the Federal 
Government, economic and financial authority remained 
decentralized on the federalist model.31  These years were 
marked by intermittent panics that caused some state bank 
failures, but also by general economic development caused by 
westward expansion and the growth of the industrial base in 
the Northeast.32 
The Civil War dramatically altered both the Federal 
*RYHUQPHQW·VQHHGIRUFHQWUDOEDQNLQJ33 and the power of the 
Federal Government in relation to state banks.34  With the 
most ardent states-­rights supporters gone from the scene 
because they had actually seceded from the Union (the 
ultimate assertion of states-­rights), Congress passed the 
National Bank Act, which, as amended, imposed taxes on state 
banks that virtually forced them to re-­charter as national 
banks, thus submitting themselves to federal regulatory 
supervision.35  However, even in the absence of the most ardent 
states-­rights supporters, Congress did not create a central 
bank subject to federal control, such as a Third National Bank.  
Instead, it merely increased both the number of de-­centralized 
banks subject to federal regulatory oversight and increased the 
degree of regulation over those banks.  The result was a more 
stable banking system, but one without a central planning 
 
29. See, e.g., id. 
30. Id. at 131. 
31. See id. at 191-­204 (discussing the Civil War and its impact on the 
American economy). 
32. See id. 
33. KAPLAN, supra note 13, at 1.  Lacking a central bank from which to 
obtain funding for the war, the Federal Government simply printed more 
currency, causing a sharp increase in inflation and lowering the value of that 
currency.  Id. 
34. See RICHARD H. TIMBERLAKE, MONETARY POLICY IN THE UNITED 
STATES 84-­103 (1993). 
35. National Bank Act, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665 (1863).  See generally Veazie 
Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. 533 (1869). 
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authority. 
Following the Civil War, the federalist impulse toward 
decentralization returned.  State banks were freed from 
onerous federal tax burdens and reserve requirements.36  The 
return of decentralization and less intrusive regulation also 
brought back the intermittent crises and panics that had 
characterized previous eras.37  In a now familiar pattern, the 
less-­regulated banks were discovered to have lent money too 
freely and to have maintained insufficient reserves.38  Once 
again, the country experienced an epidemic of bank collapses.39  
And, once again, as a result, the country was prepared to 
partially set aside its ideological distaste for central authority 
and laissez-­faire economics. 
 
E. A Little Re-­Nationalization: The Creation of the Federal 
Reserve 
 
In 1913, after several years of wrangling, Congress enacted 
WKH)HGHUDO5HVHUYH$FWWKH´$FWµ40  The Act created the basic 
Federal Reserve structure that exists today.  The Federal 
5HVHUYH %RDUG ´)HGHUDO 5HVHUYHµ ZRXOG QRW KDYH WKH
centralized power of a central bank based upon European 
models, but it carried considerably more federal regulatory 
authority than had existed since the demise of the Second 
National Bank.41  The Federal Reserve would oversee a 
network of twelve regional or District Federal Reserve Banks 
´'LVWULFW %DQNVµ SULYDWH FRUSRUDWLRQV UXQ E\ DSSRLQWHG
private citizens.42  The District Banks, in turn, would act as the 
 
36. See, e.g., John Steele Gordon, A Short Banking History of the United 
States, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2008, at A17. 
37. Crises, panics, and collapses occurred in 1873, 1884, 1893, and 1907.  
Elmus Wicker, Banking Panics in the US: 1873-­1933, EH.NET ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
Sept. 4, 2001, http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/wicker.banking.panics.us. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 261 (1913).  See generally ALLAN 
H. MELTZER, A HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE, 1913-­1951 (2003);; DONALD 
R. WELLS, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM (2004). 
41. See MELTZER, supra note 40, at 65-­73, for a discussion of the passage 
of the Federal Reserve Act. 
42. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE 
SYSTEM: PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 3, 6-­11 (9th ed. 2005), available at http:// 
www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_complete.pdf. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/16
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EDQNV· EDQN, issuing currency and lending money to member 
banks at a rate determined by the Board.43  The District Banks 
were also authorized to buy and sell United States debt 
obligations, enabling the Federal Government to borrow money 
DQG IXUWKHU HQDEOLQJ WKH 'LVWULFW %DQNV WR LQIOXHQFH EDQNV· 
lending activities.44  Member banks were subject to regulatory 
oversight.45 
,Q WKHZRUGV RI WKH)HGHUDO5HVHUYH LWVHOI LW EHFDPH ´DQ
XQXVXDOPL[WXUHRISXEOLFDQGSULYDWHHOHPHQWVµWKDWWRJHWKHU
SURGXFHG D ´GHFHQWUDOL]HG FHQWUDO EDQNµ46  Conservatives 
denounced the Act, and the authority it created, as a 
government takeover of private industry.47  The editorial board 
of the New York Times gave clear voice to that concern: 
 
[P]olitical control over the banking system of the 
country is secured.  . . .  
. . . If anything is lacking to the 
completeness of this centralized control it must 
be in respect to some detail that escaped the 
attention of the authors of the bill. 
. . . . 
. . . It reflects the rooted dislike and distrust 
of banks and bankers that has been for many 
years a great moving force in the Democratic 
Party . . . .  The measure goes to the very 
extreme in establishing absolute political control 
over the business of banking.48 
 
In its initial years, the Federal Reserve worked well 
enough, along with general economic prosperity that resulted 
from supplying European powers at war with raw materials 
 
43. Id. at 6-­11, 16. 
44. Id. at 37-­38. 
45. Id. at 4-­5. 
46. Federal Reserve Education, The Federal Reserve Structure Tour, 
http://www.federalreserveeducation.org/fed101_html/structure/tour/tour.htm 
(last visited Nov. 21, 2009). 
47. Similar arguments, of course, are common-­place today.  See, e.g., 
0DUN/HLERYLFK ¶6RFLDOLVP·%RR+LVV5HSHDW, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2009, at 
WK 1. 
48. Editorial, A Radical Banking Measure, N. Y. TIMES, June 21, 1913, at 
8. 
9
2009] NATIONALIZATION, DE-­NATIONALIZATION 133 
and manufactured goods, that it fell into the same conundrum 
that helped kill the Second National Bank: it did not seem 
particularly necessary to cede power to an ideologically 
distasteful central regulatory authority.  As a result, the 
District Banks were reluctant to tighten lending to member 
banks despite their speculative lending and investments and 
despite low bank capitalization and reserves.49 
The relatively weak position held by the Federal Reserve 
would soon come to haunt it.50  Speculative investments and 
poorly secured debt triggered a stock market crash, which led 
to decreased consumer spending, thus leading to high 
unemployment and, finally, to further decreased consumer 
spending and massive loan defaults.51  Those loan defaults, 
together with speculative investing and low cash reserves, 
combined to trigger an epidemic of bank failures, which 
impoverished depositors and led to yet more loan defaults.52  
The result was an economic crisis that engulfed the world.53 
 
F. A Lot More Nationalization: New Dealing with the Once 
and Future Crisis 
 
1. Banking Reform 
 
Faced with the greatest economic FROODSVH LQ WKHQDWLRQ·V
history, the Hoover Administration found itself paralyzed by its 
ideological opposition to central planning and regulatory 
authority.54 
 
a. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
 
Hoover and his administration reluctantly created the 
5HFRQVWUXFWLRQ )LQDQFH &RUSRUDWLRQ ´5)&µ EXW VDZ LW DV
 
49. MELTZER, supra note 40, at 248-­52. 
50. See id. at 264-­65. 
51. See generally ELMUS WICKER, THE BANKING PANICS OF THE GREAT 
DEPRESSION (2000). 
52. Id. at 46-­47. 
53. Id. 
54. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE 
COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 477 (1958) (noting that Hoover regarded the New 
'HDODVDQWLWKHWLFDOWR´WKHZKROHSKLORVRSK\RILQGLYLGXDOOLEHUW\µ 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/16
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´SULPDULO\ D SV\FKRORJLFDOZHDSRQµ GHVLJQHG WR UHVWRUH SXEOLF
confidence, rather than as an actual instrument of policy.55  
8QGHU +RRYHU WKH 5)&·V IXQFWLRQ ZDV VWULFWO\ OLPLWHG WR
making small emergency loans for banks and insurance 
companies only if the companies could provide adequate 
collateral security.56  Secretary of the Treasury Ogden Mills did 
not bother to try to disguise his distaste for the institution, 
UHDVVXULQJFRQVHUYDWLYHVWKDW´WKHVRoner it is created . . . the 
OHVVXVHZHZLOOKDYHWRPDNHRILWµ57  President Hoover shared 
the 6HFUHWDU\·VGLVFRPIRUWZKHQ&RQJUHVVDWWHPSWHGWRH[SDQG
the lending powers of the RFC, Hoover denounced the idea in 
terms that made it clear that he found central planning and 
IHGHUDO UHJXODWRU\ DXWKRULW\ DEKRUUHQW ´1HYHU EHIRUHµ KH
FODLPHG´KDVVRGDQJHURXVDVXJJHVWLRQEHHQVHULRXVO\PDGHWR
RXUFRXQWU\µ58 
By the time President Roosevelt was inaugurated in 1933, 
ideology was a luxury neither policy-­makers nor the public 
could afford.  Pragmatism was again a necessity.  The post-­
ideological pragmatism of the New Deal was perhaps best 
embodied in the flamboyant figure most responsible for the 
implementation of the evolving finance system: Jesse Jones.  
Jones once claimed that the three most important ingredients 
IRU KLV KDSSLQHVV ZHUH ´IDPLO\ UHOLJLRQ DQG PRQH\µ59 
DOWKRXJKDVKLVWRULDQ$UWKXU6FKOHVLQJHUZU\O\QRWHG´>V@RPH
PLJKW ZRQGHU ZKHWKHU WKLV DFFXUDWHO\ VWDWHG WKH SULRULW\µ60  
Roosevelt placed Jones at the head of the RFC, where, with 
expanded powers, he had a great impact.61  6FKOHVLQJHU·V
description of Jones warrants quotation in full: 
 
He was profane and taciturn in the Texas 
manner, loved power, was indifferent to ideology, 
never read books, had no sentimental illusions 
about the underdog, and kept his word.  He could 
do business with anybody, even New Dealers, 
 
55. Id. at 426-­27. 
56. Id. at 427. 
57. Id. (quoting Secretary of the Treasury Ogden Mills). 
58. Id. (quoting President Herbert Hoover). 
59. Id. at 426 (quoting Jesse Jones). 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 427, 430. 
11
2009] NATIONALIZATION, DE-­NATIONALIZATION 135 
even Wall Street.62 
 
The R)&·V JRDO ZDV WR KDYH EDQNV OHQG WR EXVLQHVVHV
again.  In order to lend, banks needed capital, obtained not 
through loans that further weakened their balance sheets, but 
through the issuance and sale of preferred stock to the RFC.63  
Banking industry leaderVUHVLVWLQJWKH´WKUHDWRIJRYHUQPHQW
FRQWURO RI WKH EDQNLQJ V\VWHPµ DW ILUVW UHIXVHG WR VHOO HTXLW\
interests to the RFC.64  Jones warned that if the banks refused 
to cooperate, the Federal Government would begin loaning to 
businesses directly, bypassing banks entirely and thereby 
destroying private commercial banking.65  In essence, the 
Roosevelt Administration presented the banking industry with 
a choice: partial nationalization of banks through preferred 
stock purchases or complete nationalization of baQNV· OHQGLQJ
function.66  Faced with that choice, bankers chose partial 
nationalization and sold preferred stock to the RFC.67 
  
b. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
 
To restore public confidence in banks and stem the cycle of 
panicked depositor bank runs, the Banking Act of 1933 created 
WKH )HGHUDO 'HSRVLW ,QVXUDQFH &RUSRUDWLRQ ´)',&µ
guaranteeing the availability of retail deposits.68  With that 
guarantee, however, came much greater regulatory oversight.69  
In addition, banks were required to separate their commercial 
and investment bank functions.70  Within two years, the 
 
62. Id. at 426. 
63. Id. at 427-­28. 
64. Id. at 428. 
65. Id. at 428. 
66. Id. at 428-­29. 
67. Id. at 429-­30. 
68. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933).  The Banking Act 
was commonly known as the Glass-­Steagall Act.  See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Glass-­
Steagall Act (1933), 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/g/glass_steagall_
act_1933/index.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Glass-­Steagall 
Act (1933)];; MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, A HISTORY OF MONEY AND BANKING IN THE 
UNITED STATES: THE COLONIAL ERA TO WWII, at 342-­43 (2002). 
69. See, e.g., Glass-­Steagall Act (1933), supra note 68;; ROTHBARD, supra 
note 68, at 342-­43. 
70. See, e.g., Glass-­Steagall Act (1933), supra note 68. 
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136 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  30:124 
Banking Act of 1935 again broadened the powers of the Federal 
Reserve, increasing both its supervisory regulatory power over 
banks and its ability to use interest rates on loans to banks to 
control commercial lending practices.71 
 
2. Housing Finance Reform 
 
The Roosevelt Administration soon turned its focus to the 
housing finance system.72  One pernicious effect of the banking 
crisis was the paralysis of housing finance.73  Similar to the 
current crisis, the Great Depression was preceded by an 
unprecedented spike in home prices and the accumulation of 
mortgage debt, both fueled by lax lending standards.74  
Defaults and foreclosures increased dramatically, and banks 
simply stopped lending for home purchases.75  The Roosevelt 
Administration devised a number of pragmatic responses to the 
problem, which were revised in accordance with their 
effectiveness in practice.76 
 
a. The Federal Home Loan Bank System and the 
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation 
 
The Roosevelt Administration recognized that credit was 
frozen for home lending institutions such as savings and loans 
and mutual savings banks.77  It empowered the Federal Home 
/RDQ%DQN´)+/%µFUHDWHGLQWRSURYLGHORDQVWRWKHVH
institutions, so that they in turn could lend to home buyers.78  
 
71. Banking Act of 1935, ch. 88, 49 Stat. 684 (1935).  See also JANE W. 
'·$RISTA, THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. FINANCE: FEDERAL RESERVE MONETARY 
POLICY, 1915-­1935, at 182-­94 (1994). 
72. David C. Wheelock, The Federal Response to Home Mortgage 
Distress: Lessons from the Great Depression, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS 
REV., May/June 2008, at 137, available at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/08/05/Wheelock.pdf. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. $FFRUGLQJ WR VWDWLVWLFV FLWHG E\:KHHORFN DQ DVWRXQGLQJ ´ RI
urban, owner-­RFFXSLHGKRPHVµVXEMHFW WR ILUVWPRUWJDJHVZHUH LQGHIDXOWE\
January 1, 1934.  Id. at 138. 
76. Id. at 140. 
77. Id. at 141. 
78. Id. 
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In 1934, Congress passed the National Housing Act,79 which, 
among other things, created the Federal Savings and Loan 
,QVXUDQFH &RUSRUDWLRQ ´)6/,&µ DV DQ DUP RI WKH )+/%
which essentially served as an FDIC for home lending 
institutions.80  It provided insurance for retail deposits at those 
institutions so that consumers would have the confidence to 
make deposits, which could then be loaned out for housing 
purchases.81  Together, the FHLB and the FSLIC worked to 
increase liquidity at home lending institutions in order to 
trigger a chain reaction that would reverse the epidemic of 
foreclosures.82  The greater availability of loans from home 
lending institutions could lower the cost of borrowing for home 
buyers.  More home buyers could create demand in the housing 
market and slowly raise home values, which had plummeted.  
Rising home values could allow some homeowners to refinance 
their mortgage loans to avoid foreclosure. 
 
b. 7KH+RPH2ZQHUV·/RDQ&RUSRUDWion 
 
Many delinquent mortgages could not be saved by 
refinancing if home owners had to wait for home values to 
rise.83  In response, the Roosevelt Administration created the 
SXEOLFSULYDWH K\EULG +RPH 2ZQHUV· /RDQ &RUSRUDWLRQ
(financed publicly, in part, and partly through tax-­favored 
private investment) in 1933.84  This institution had a simple 
but crucial mission: buy delinquent mortgages from home 
lending institutions, and then work with home owners to 
refinance them on less risky and more responsible terms.85  As 
a result, banks were able to sell the mortgages that they 
wanted to get rid of the most, which reduced their bad debt and 
increased their liquidity.86  For homeowners, short-­term, 
adjustable rate, and balloon mortgages were converted to long-­
 
79. National Housing Act, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934). 
80. Wheelock, supra note 72, at 141. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 140. 
83. Id. at 141. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 142. 
86. Id. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/16
138 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  30:124 
term, fixed-­rate mortgages.87  In order to qualify for the 
restructured loans, borrowers were required to present proof of 
sufficient income relative to their debt.88  In 1934, HOLC 
activity dwarfed private home finance lending activities.89  At 
the height of its activities, the HOLC held almost 20% of all 
home mortgages in the United States.90  In other words, an 
agency of the Federal Government held the mortgage to one-­in-­
five homes in the country.91 
 
c. The Federal Housing Administration 
 
In addition to the creation of the FSLIC, the National 
Housing Act of 1934 had two other major impacts on the 
structure of housing finance in the United States.  First, it 
FUHDWHG WKH )HGHUDO +RXVLQJ $GPLQLVWUDWLRQ ´)+$µ92  To 
encourage responsible lending standards by home lending 
institutions, the FHA offered to insure mortgage loans that met 
its quality and risk standards.93  The FHA required that the 
loans it insured were fixed-­rate, long-­term, and had a 
maximum loan-­to-­value ratio of 80% (in other words, home 
buyers were required to make a 20% down payment).94 
 
d. The Federal National Mortgage Association 
 
The last major impact of the National Housing Act of 1934 
was that it authorized the creation of an agency to purchase 
mortgages from home lending institutions and sell them to 
investors.  Jesse Jones and the RFC stepped in at the request 
of President Roosevelt and created the Federal National 
0RUWJDJH $VVRFLDWLRQ ´)10$µ QRZ NQRZQ RI FRXUVH DV
Fannie Mae.95  The FNMA created a secondary market in 
which home lending institutions could sell mortgages that met 
FNMA quality standards.96  In other words, the FNMA would 
 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 142-­43. 
90. Id. at 142. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 144. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
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buy mortgage loans from home lending institutions at some 
percentage of their present value.97  The lenders would receive 
a one-­time cash payment and be relieved of any risk from the 
KRPHEX\HU·VSRWHQWLDOGHIDXOW98  That risk was transferred to 
the FNMA.99  Not only did banks receive a great incentive to 
increase their home lending activity, the FNMA was able, 
through its purchase standards, to impose quality standards 
that lasted for decades. 
Not only did the discreet agencies fulfill their individual 
functions well, but they also operated well together as a 
housing finance system.  The FHLB provided liquidity,100 the 
HOLC purchased and refinanced delinquent mortgages,101 the 
FHA insured quality mortgages,102 and the FNMA created a 
secondary market on which quality mortgages could be sold, 
increasing lender liquidity, removing risk, and standardizing 
quality.103  In many ways, the FNMA was the most spectacular 
success of all the housing finance reforms.  It not only 
contributed to housing finance stabilization, it actually created 
a massive and thriving secondary market in mortgages that 
became the principle engine of the post-­ZDU´$PHULFDQGUHDPµ
of home ownership.104 
 
G. Post-­Depression De-­Nationalization: The Long March from 
Economic Crisis to Deregulation to Economic Crisis 
 
The New Deal housing finance system worked so well in 
the years following the Depression that three things happened.  
 
95. Id. at 145. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Daniel J. McDonald & Daniel L. Thornton, A Primer on the Mortgage 
Market and Mortgage Finance, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV., Jan./Feb. 
2008, at 31, 36, available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/ 
08/01/McDonald.pdf. 
99. Id. 
100. Wheelock, supra note 72, at 140. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. ,QIDFW)DQQLH0DH·VKHDGTXDUWHUVDUHORFDWHGRQ$PHULFDQ'UHDP
Way in Reston, Virginia.  Fannie Mae in Reston, Va., http://www. 
superpages.com/bp/Reston-­VA/Fannie-­Mae-­L2041630424.htm (last visited on 
Nov. 8, 2009). 
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First, access to home ownership increased dramatically and 
came to be thought of as a critical component of the American 
dream of middle-­class prosperity.105  Second, many people 
forgot that the system was there, even as it continued to 
function.  Indeed, continuing popular confusion about the 
control of, and roles played by, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
may owe itself, to a large extent, to the invisibility of the 
secondary mortgage market they created.106  Third, to those for 
whom central planning and extensive regulatory oversight was 
ideologically distasteful, it no longer seemed very necessary.107  
In a Groundhog Day108²like repeat of the past, as the crisis 
receded from memory, regulatory oversight and central 
planning were scaled back.109 
The HOLC was the first victim of its success.  It had 
played a major role in ending the foreclosure epidemic, as it 
acquired an enormous percentage of private home lending 
LQVWLWXWLRQV· GHOLQTXHQW ORDQV ´WR[LF DVVHWVµ LQ WRGD\·V
terminology, and restructured them into performing assets.110  
But those performing assets were a tremendous temptation to 
the now-­rescued lenders, and they put intense pressure on 
Congress to require HOLC to liquidate, selling its assets at fire 
sale prices to the lenders it had once rescued.111  HOLC 
resisted, but many were sympathetic to the bankers, since the 
massive presence of a government agency, now essentially in 
competition with private industry, struck many in Washington 
as ideologically abhorrent.112  As the National Bureau 
delicately but aptly summarized the debate: 
 
105. See, e.g., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP·T OF COMMERCE, 
TRACKING THE AMERICAN DREAM: FIFTY YEARS OF HOUSING CHANGES (1994), 
available at http://www.census.gov/apsd/www/statbrief/sb94_8.pdf. 
106. See FREDDIE MAC, FOCUS ON: FREDDIE MAC  ´)RU WKHPRVW
SDUW ZKDW ZH GR LV LQYLVLEOH WR FRQVXPHUVµ available at 
http://www.freddiemac.com/mbs/docs/fs_freddiemac.pdf. 
107. See McDonald & Thornton, supra note 98, at 35 (noting that the 
secondary mortgage market became increasingly attractive to private 
competitors throughout the late twentieth century). 
108. GROUNDHOG DAY (Columbia Pictures 1993). 
109. See Wheelock, supra note 72, at 139-­45. 
110. Id. at 141-­44. 
111. See C. LOWELL HARRISS, HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOME 
OWNERS· LOAN CORPORATION 159-­81 (1951) GLVFXVVLQJ WKH ´>I@LQDQFLDO
>O@LTXLGDWLRQRIWKH+RPH2ZQHUV·/RDQ&RUSRUDWLRQµ 
112. See, e.g., id. 
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While private agencies were understandably 
DWWUDFWHG WR WKH+2/&·VDVVHWV WKH&RUSRUDWLRQ
opposed the principle of transferring its 
mortgages to private institutions. . . .  
. . . Not the least was the question of the 
proper relationship between public and private 
institutions in the financial system, and whether 
an agency set up to aid private finance in time of 
economic depression was justified in holding on 
to the assets so acquired until their final 
liquidation in an improved economic climate. 
This question was raised directly or implicitly 
throughout the discussions.  There was generally 
an acceptance of the principle that, other things 
being equal, private facilities should be used in 
preference to government.  The fact that the 
government through the HOLC had materially 
DVVLVWHG WKH QDWLRQ·V ILQDQFLDO LQVWLWXWLRQV ZDV
pointed out, presumably with the inference that 
these institutions would be inconsistent (and 
ungrateful) if they forced the HOLC to terminate 
its activities.113 
 
Inconsistent and ungrateful or not, in 1943 the lenders got 
their wish as Congress passed a bill requiring HOLC to 
liquidate and sell its assets.  HOLC was completely liquidated 
by 1951.114 
During the 1950s, the FHA also began to lose its 
influence.115  Home lenders began to offer loans with lower 
down-­payment ratios than the FHA would insure.116  But the 
)+$·V UHIXVDO WR LQVXUH WKH ORDQV GLG QRW FXUWDLO ULVN\ ORDQ
origination, as it had been designed to do;; instead, private 
insurers entered the market offering to insure those loans.117  
Over time, the percent of home loans insured by the FHA 
 
113. Id. at 173. 
114. Id. 
115. See John M. Quigley, Federal Credit and Insurance Programs: 
Housing, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV., July/Aug. 2006, at 281, 283-­84. 
116. Id. at 285. 
117. Id. 
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steadily decreased as low down-­payment, adjustable-­rate loans 
became more and more commonplace.118 
In 1968, Fannie Mae was nearly fully privatized;; it became 
D´JRYHUQPHQW-­VSRQVRUHGHQWLW\µRU*6(PHDQLQJLWUHWDined 
certain tax and borrowing privileges, but its stock was now 
held by private investors.119  Fannie Mae continued to purchase 
mortgage loans from their originating lenders and sell them on 
the secondary market.  In 1970, Congress created a second 
GSE, Freddie Mac, to create a parallel secondary market for 
mortgages originated by savings and loans.120  It too was owned 
by private investors.  Although Congress retained some 
persuasive power over the GSEs through the threat of revoking 
or curtailing their privileges, the corporations were now 
independent of any direct or indirect government control.  After 
privatization, both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac began to 
securitize pools of mortgages and sell those securities on the 
secondary market.121  These instruments became known as 
MBSs.122 
Finally, the FSLIC and the FHLB, as insurers to savings 
and loans, became insolvent as a result of the wave of savings 
and loan failures in the 1980s.123  Congress declined to rescue 
them, and by the 1990s most of the New Deal institutions had 
been either fundamentally altered or disbanded entirely. 
 
H. Preliminary Conclusions 
 
From this review of the history of the cyclic ebb and flow of 
central planning and federal regulation over the banking and 
housing finance industries, two conclusions are apparent.  
First, the concept of nationalization itself is not particularly 
 
118. Id. at 285-­87. 
119. Id. at 294. 
120. Id. 
121. See, e.g., Leland C. Brendsel, 6HFXULWL]DWLRQ·V 5ROH LQ +RXVLQJ
Finance: The Special Contributions of the Government-­Sponsored Enterprises, 
in A PRIMER ON SECURITIZATION 19-­22 (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J. 
Fischman, eds., 2d prtg. 1997). 
122. See, e.g., id. 
123. Both were ultimately abolished under the Financial Institutions 
Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989.  Pub. L. No. 101-­73, 103 Stat. 
183, tit. IV, sec. 401 (1989). 
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useful and may do little more than stir ideological opposition.124  
It is much more useful to think of central planning and 
regulatory control as a continuum along which the United 
States has moved back and forth.  The banking and housing 
finance industries of the United States have never been either 
completely under Federal Government control or completely 
free of its control. 
6HFRQG LI ZH GHILQH ´QDWLRQDOL]DWLRQµ WR PHDQ IDLUO\
extensive government intervention in the banking and housing 
finance industries, it is not as foreign a concept as it may 
appear.  In fact, it is a consistently recurring phenomenon 
throughout the 8QLWHG 6WDWHV· KLVWRU\ RIWHQ IRU YHU\ JRRG
reason.  The shock and wonder expressed by some politicians 
and commentators at the prospect of extensive intervention, 
e.g., nationalization, reveals a lack of historical perspective.125  
Like Miranda in The Tempest,126 many have failed to realize 
that this is not a brave new world;; it is new only to them. 
 
II. Re-­Nationalization: Dealing Again with the Former and 
Present Economic Crisis 
 
My purpose here is to review only very briefly the causes of 
the current crisis and the plans currently being enacted to 
combat it.  The focus here is to make the case that both the 
crisis and the proposed responses to it were foreseeable because 
they fit well within the pattern of de-­nationalization and re-­
nationalization of the banking and housing finance industries 
that runs throughout the history of the United States. 
The 1990s saw rapid growth in the number of barely 
regulated private enterprises, such as Countrywide, offering 
´VXESULPHµOHQGLQJWRKRPHEX\HUVZKRFRXOGQRWKDYHTXDOLILHG
 
124. Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi recently 
DVNHGUKHWRULFDOO\´:RXOGZHKDYHHYHUWKRXJKWZHZRXOGVHHWKHGD\ZKHQ
ZH·G EHXVLQJ WKDW WHUPLQRORJ\"  ¶1DWLRQDOL]DWLRQ RI WKH EDQNV"·µ 'DYLG(
Sanger, Nationalization Gets a New, Serious Look, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2009, 
DW $  %XW DV 5HSUHVHQWDWLYH0D[LQH:DWHUV UHFHQWO\ ZDUQHG ´7KHZRUG
¶QDWLRQDOL]DWLRQ·VFDUHVWKHKHOORXWRISHRSOHµ6RUDJKDQsupra note 8. 
125. 2WKHUVKRZHYHUKDYHUHFRJQL]HGWKDW´QDWLRQDOL]DWLRQµKDVSOD\HG
a recurring role in the American banking and housing finance industries.  
See, e.g., Krugman, supra QRWH ´>,@VQ·WQDWLRQDOL]DWLRQXQ-­American?  No, 
LW·VDV$PHULFDQDVDSSOHSLHµ 
126. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 5, sc. 1. 
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for either an FHA-­insured mortgage or Fannie Mae purchase-­
eligible mortgage.127  Moreover, these lenders found it lucrative 
to securitize packages of the mortgages they originated and sell 
them to investors, such as commercial banks, investment 
banks, and mutual funds.128  $V )DQQLH 0DH·V VKDUH RI WKH
secondary mortgage and MBS market fell in the face of such 
competition, it lowered its quality standards to recapture 
market share lost to the subprime lenders.129 
)URPXQWLO´KRPHSULFHVURVHDWDQDQQXDOUDWH
RI SHUFHQWµ130  Thereafter, home prices began to fall and 
some borrowers, particularly those in the subprime holding 
short-­term mortgage loans, found that their homes were now 
worth less than they owed, making refinancing the full amount 
owed impossible.131  Unable either to refinance the loan or pay 
the amount owed in full, foreclosure rates began to 
skyrocket.132  As foreclosure rates increased, the quality of 
MBSs decreased.133  Large institutional investors, including 
commercial and investment banks, found that large 
percentages of their MBS assets had been rendered 
worthless.134  Lending dried up as a result,135 which led to 
greater economic slowdown and more foreclosures, and the 
cycle began to repeat.136  That is largely where we find 
ourselves today. 
 
 
127. Charles Duhigg, Pressured to Take More Risk, Fannie Reached 
Tipping Point, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2008, at A1. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. McDonald & Thornton, supra note 98, at 31. 
131. Dina ElBoghdady & Sarah Cohen, The Growing Foreclosure Crisis, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2009, at A01. 
132. Id. 
133. See Posting of Price Fishback to Freakonomics, 
http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/12/the-­financial-­meltdown-­
now-­and-­then/ (May 12, 2009, 14:31 EST). 
134. Id. 
135. Bryan Keogh, Libor Rises, Commercial Paper Slumps as Credit 
Freeze Deepens, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 2, 2008, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=azi5ZFVQ4iic. 
136. Fishback, supra note 133. 
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A. The Bank Bailouts 
 
1. Bailout I: TARP 
 
The Bush Administration, like the Hoover Administration 
before it, found its ability to react to the developing crisis 
hamstrung by ideology.  Central planning and government 
investment in private enterprise were simply not tools that 
neo-­conservatives could bring themselves to wield.  Lacking the 
will to intervene systematically in the banking industry, yet 
unable to avoid responding to the deepening crisis, the Bush 
Administration seemed to adopt an ad hoc approach.  The 
7URXEOHG $VVHW 5HOLHI 3URJUDP ´7$53µ HPERGLHG WKLV
approach.  As first proposed by former-­Treasury Secretary 
Henry Paulson in a three-­page bill submitted to Congress on 
September 21, 2008, the program envisioned the Treasury 
wielding the power to purchase mortgage-­backed securities by 
spending up to $700 billion in emergency funds with complete 
and unreviewable discretion.137  In essence, Paulson seemed to 
have been assigned the role of Mary Bailey during the bank 
run scene from ,W·VD:RQGHUIXO/LIH138: rushing into the crisis 
with a wad of cash in time to prevent an immediate collapse of 
lending institutions, but with no plan for the future. 
As noted above, Paulson first indicated that the Treasury 
would use TARP funds to purchase bad debt, or toxic assets, 
IURPOHQGHUVWKHUHE\UHPRYLQJWKHDVVHWVIURPEDQNV·OHGJHUV
and freeing them to begin lending money again³much as the 
HOLC had done during the Great Depression.139  Then, he 
seems to have reversed course, intent instead on infusing 
lenders with liquidity in order to spark lending activity to 
 
137. Text of Draft Proposal for Bailout Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2008, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/business/21draftcnd.html.  
$V RULJLQDOO\ SURSRVHG 3DXOVRQZRXOG KDYH EHHQ HPSRZHUHG ´to purchase, 
and to make and fund commitments to purchase, on such terms and 
conditions as determined by the Secretary, mortgage-­related assets from any 
ILQDQFLDO LQVWLWXWLRQKDYLQJLWVKHDGTXDUWHUV LQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVµ  Id.  He 
DOVR ZRXOG KDYH EHHQ HPSRZHUHG WR GHVLJQDWH ´ILQDQFLDO LQVWLWXWLRQV DV
ILQDQFLDO DJHQWV RI WKH JRYHUQPHQWµ DQG DOO RI KLV GHFLVLRQV ZHUH WR KDYH
EHHQ´QRQ-­reviewablHDQGFRPPLWWHGWRDJHQF\GLVFUHWLRQµDQGFRXOG´QRWEH
UHYLHZHGE\DQ\FRXUWRIODZRUDQ\DGPLQLVWUDWLYHDJHQF\µId. 
138. IT·S A WONDERFUL LIFE (Liberty Films II 1946). 
139. Fishback, supra note 133. 
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businesses, similar to the function once provided by the FHLB, 
but directed at insurers, investment banks, and commercial 
banks rather than home lending institutions.140  However, the 
banks infused with cash were not, in fact, required to lend it.141  
Acting rationally in the absence of such a requirement and in 
the face of a grave economic crisis, they instead held the cash 
in reserve, protecting their shareholders but defeating the 
purpose of the cash infusion.142 
 
2.  Bailout II: CAP 
 
The Obama Administration, through the Treasury 
Department, has begun implementation of the Capital 
$VVLVWDQFH3URJUDP´&$3µIRUIDOWHULQJOHQGHUV143  The CAP 
program differs from the cash infusion program under TARP in 
at least two important ways, both of which increase the relative 
´QDWLRQDOL]DWLRQµ RI WKH LQGXVWU\  First, CAP requires that 
applicants undergo an examination of their books before 
receiving investment, thereby increasing the amount of federal 
regulatory oversight of the institutions.144  Second, it requires 
the institutions to issue preferred stock in exchange for the 
investment, thereby increasing government ownership of 
formerly private enterprises.145  In short, CAP moves the 
relationship between American society and its banks a little 
further along the nationalization continuum, increasing the 
historically ideologically distasteful role of the federal 
 
140. Id. 
141. Editorial, /RDQV"'LG:H6D\:H·G'R/RDQV", N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 
2008, at A30.  AIG, Citigroup, Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Wells 
Fargo, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley are among the insurers, 
commercial banks, and investment banks that have received cash infusions 
under the TARP program.  Participants in Government Investment Plan, 
Washington Post, http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/st_BANK 
MONEY_20081027.html (last visited on Nov. 8, 2009). 
142. See Editorial, supra note 141. 
143. See, e.g., U.S. DEP·T OF THE TREASURY, THE CAPITAL ASSISTANCE 
PROGRAM AND ITS ROLE IN THE FINANCIAL STABILITY PLAN (2009), available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/tg40_capwhitepaper.pdf;; 
FinancialStability.gov, Capital Assistance Program, 
http://www.financialstability.gov/roadtostability/capitalassistance.html (last 
visited Oct. 8, 2009). 
144. FinancialStability.gov, supra note 143. 
145. Id. 
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government in central planning and regulatory oversight.  In 
fact, many formerly staunch free-­market supporters are now 
urging the Obama Administration to assume controlling 
interests in the banks that may be beyond saving through cash 
infusions and greater regulatory oversight,146 and we have 
already begun state ownership of massive parts of the formerly 
privately-­owned banking and housing finance industries.147  
The United States is now the largest shareholder in both 
Citigroup and Bank of America.148 
 
B. Housing Finance Reforms 
 
1. Re-­Nationalization of Fannie Mae and Nationalization of 
Freddie Mac 
 
On September 6, 2008, Fannie Mae, burdened by its 
disastrous foray into subprime lending and on the brink of total 
collapse,149 was re-­nationalized.150  Similarly, Freddie Mac was 
nationalized.151 Now controlled by the Obama Administration 
as agents of its housing finance reform agenda, their missions 
have been substantially revised.152  They are now charged with 
 
146. In the tongue-­in-­cheek words of economist Paul Krugman, 
´&RPUDGH*UHHQVSDQZDQWVXVWRVHL]HWKHHFRQRP\·VFRPPDQGLQJKHLJKWVµ
Krugman, supra note 8.  See also Matthew Richardson & Nouriel Roubini, 
Outlook, 1DWLRQDOL]HWKH%DQNV:H·UHDOO6ZHGHV1RZ, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 
DW%´$VIUHH-­market economists teaching at a business school in the 
KHDUW RI WKH ZRUOG·V ILQDQFLDO FDSLWDO ZH IHHO GRZQULJKW EODVSKHPRXV
proposing an all-­out government takeover of the banking system.  But the 
U.S. financial system has reached such a dangerous tipping point that little 
FKRLFHUHPDLQVµ 
147. See, e.g., Participants in Government Investment Plan, supra note 
141. 
148. Eric Dash, U.S. is Said to Agree to Raise Stake in Citigroup, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 27, 2009, at A1;; Eric Dash, Louise Story & Andrew Ross Sorkin, 
Bank of America to Receive Additional $20 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2009, 
at B1. 
149. In 2008, Fannie Mae lost more than its net profit for the previous 
sixteen years combined.  Charles Duhigg, U.S. Likely to Keep the Reins on 
Fannie and Freddie, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2009, at A1. 
150. Stephen Labaton & Edmund L. Andrews, In Rescue to Stabilize 
Lending, U.S. Takes Over Mortgage Finance Titans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 
2008, at A1. 
151. Id. 
152. Duhigg, supra note 149. 
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implementing the Making Home Affordable program, 
restructuring mortgages to prevent foreclosures much in the 
manner of the HOLC program during the Great Depression.153  
Much like HOLC in 1934, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac now 
find themselves as dominant and absolutely critical 
participants in the housing finance system.154  It seems that 
LGHRORJLFDOGLVWDVWHZKLFKOHGWR+2/&·VOLTXLGDWLRQDJDLQKDV
given way to pragmatic necessity. 
 
III. De-­Nationalization and Re-­Nationalization in Other 
Countries: A Comparative Perspective 
 
,WLVLQWHUHVWLQJWRFRPSDUHWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV·UHODWLRQVKLS
with its banking and housing finance systems with the 
relationships of other nations with their own systems.  What 
the comparison reveals is that even though different nations 
may start with remarkably different ideological biases, their 
relationships with banking and housing finance industries 
exhibit the same tumultuous dynamic that characterizes the 
United States.  In times of crisis, ideology gives way to 
pragmatic necessity.  When the pragmatic steps necessary to 
end crises succeed, ideological bias re-­emerges until the next 
crisis. 
 
A. Canada 
 
The Canadian banking system has weathered the current 
economic crisis remarkably well.  According to the World 
Economic Forum, the Canadian banking system is the soundest 
in the world.155  Ironically, the strength of the Canadian system 
stems largely from the fact that it was modeled on the 
Hamiltonian, centralized United States national bank 
 
153. See FinancialStability.gov, Making Home Affordable, 
http://www.financialstability.gov/roadtostability/homeowner.html (last 
visited July 16, 2009). 
154. See id.;; see also Edmund L. Andrews, Mortgage Plan Targets up to 
Four Million Homeowners, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2009. 
155. WORLD ECON. FORUM, GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2008-­2009, 
at 129 (2008), available at 
http://www.weforum.org/documents/GCR0809/index.html. 
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system.156  Unlike the United States, however, Canada was not 
persuaded by the ideological distaste for central planning that 
led the United States to jettison the Hamiltonian system.  
Canada, of course, has major private lending institutions, but 
they are all chartered by the national government and 
regulated accordingly.157 
A major aspect of that regulation concerns home lending.  
Most Canadian home mortgage loans are short-­term and have 
adjustable rates;; however, unless they are insured under the 
National Housing Act, they require a 20% down-­payment at 
origination.158 
The Canadian government pragmatically restricted the 
riskiest home financing activities at the time those activities 
were flourishing in the United States.159  Three factors in 
particular led Canadian banks to avoid originating subprime 
mortgage loans.160  First, Canadian banks, like British banks, 
fund mortgage loans largely through deposits rather than 
capital obtained in secondary markets.161  Second, Canadian 
banks are required to keep higher capital reserves than their 
American counterparts, reducing the capital on hand to lend 
and increasing the incentive to lend it well.162  Third, Canadian 
EDQNV NHHS PRUWJDJH ORDQV ´LQ-­KRXVHµ UDWKHU WKDQ VHFXULWL]H
and sell them to others.163  As a result, Canadian banks had 
little incentive to lend unwisely.  Despite the fact that most 
Canadian home mortgage loans are short-­term and have 
adjustable rates,164 the Canadian bank and home financing 
systems have emerged as the soundest in the world during the 
 
156. Theresa Tedesco, Op-­Ed., The Great Solvent North, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 28, 2009, at A23. 
157. Id. 
158. FIN. CONSUMER AGENCY OF CAN., THE ABCS OF MORTGAGES, 
http://www.acfc-­fcac.gc.ca/eng/publications/mortgages/DownPayments-­
eng.asp (last visited Nov. 10, 2009). 
159. Tedesco, supra note 156. 
160. Id. 
161. See Pietro S. Nivola & John C. Courtney, Know Thy Neighbor: What 
Canada Can Tell Us About Financial Regulation, BROOKINGS INST., Apr. 23, 
2009, available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2009/0423_canada_ 
nivola.aspx. 
162. Id. 
163. Tedesco, supra note 156. 
164. See id. 
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current crisis.165 
 
B. Sweden 
 
6ZHGHQ LV WKH ELUWK SODFH RI WKH LQIDPRXV ´7KLUG:D\µ
between capitalism and socialism.166  Perhaps it should not 
come as a surprise then that the Swedish response to economic 
crises has been characterized by anti-­ideological pragmatism.  
Today, many in the United States are calling for a response to 
the current economic crisis modeled on the pragmatic Swedish 
response to its crisis in the early 1990s.167 
The Swedish model of nationalization is characterized by a 
complete government takeover of private institutions for the 
shortest amount of time as possible, after which they are 
returned to the private market.168  When Swedish banks began 
to collapse under the weight of toxic assets, the national 
government established an institution called Securum, which 
EHFDPH D KROGLQJ WDQN IRU EDQNV· WR[LF DVVHWV DQG LQ VRPH
cases, for entire banks.169  Banks were infused with capital so 
that they could resume lending activities now controlled by the 
national government.170  The Swedish state assumed ownership 
of bank assets, wiping out existing shareholders, but returning 
proceeds from liquidation to the Swedish treasury.171  
Businesses that fell under government control, including 
industrial companies, were eventually de-­nationalized and 
resumed private operations.172 
 
C. Britain 
 
If the United States is generally regarded as the most 
 
165. See WORLD ECON. FORUM, supra 155, at 129. 
166. See, e.g., PHILIP WHYMAN, SWEDEN AND THE ´7HIRD WAYµ (2003). 
167. See Richardson & Roubini, supra note 146 ´%DVLFDOO\ ZH·UH DOO
Swedes now.  We have used all our bullets, and the boogeyman is still 
FRPLQJ/HW·VSXOORXWWKHED]RRNDDQGEHGRQHZLWKLWµ 
168. Carter Dougherty, 6ZHGHQ·V)L[IRU%DQNV1DWLRQDOL]H7KHP, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 23, 2009, at B1. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
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ardently free-­market economy in the West, Britain is probably 
VHFRQG$OWKRXJK%ULWDLQ·V/DERU3DUW\KDVLWVKLVWRULFDOURRWV
in socialism, Britain is, in fact, a relatively consistent, when 
compared with much of industrial Europe, free-­market 
economy, even under Labor Party leadership.  And although 
the Bank of England is responsible for maintaining stability in 
the financial system as a whole, its relationship to its troubled 
banks has been relatively laissez-­faire;; it has been British 
SROLF\IRUWKHSDVW\HDUVWROHWLQGLYLGXDOLQVWLWXWLRQV´VLQN
RU VZLPµRQ WKHLURZQ173  The role envisaged for the Bank of 
England is to provide loans to prevent the contagion of failure 
from spreading to the banking system generally, but to let 
banks in trouble fail.  Yet in response to the current economic 
crisis, the British government found itself, in the face of 
enormous controversy, saving several major banks, including 
Northern Rock, The Royal Bank of Scotland, and Barclays.174  
More may be on the horizon.175 
%ULWDLQ·V KRXVLQJ ILQDQFH V\VWHP DFWXDOO\ UHVHPEOHV WKH
pre-­Depression U.S. system: home loans are usually funded by 
deposits at banks rather than by capital obtained through 
selling mortgages on a secondary market.176  In addition, most 
home mortgage loans are adjustable-­rate rather than fixed-­
rate.177  As lending has decreased in response to the current 
crisis, interest rates have increased, increasing the 
vulnerability of British homeowners to foreclosure.178  As a 
result, similar to what has happened in the United States, the 
British government finds itself intervening to restructure 
mortgage loans. 
 
 
173. Alistair Milne & Geoffrey Wood, Banking Crisis Solutions Old and 
New, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV., Sept./Oct. 2008, at 517, 524, 
available at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/08/09/Milne.pdf. 
174. UK Banks Receive £37bn Bail-­Out, BBC NEWS, Oct. 13, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7666570.stm. 
175. See id. 
176. Richard K. Green & Susan M. Wachter, The American Mortgage in 
Historical and International Context, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 102 (Fall 2005), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=908976. 
177. Id. 
178. Julia Werdigier, Foreclosures Force Britons to Ponder Shift to Fixed 
Rates, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2007, at C1. 
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D. France 
 
Unlike either Canada or Sweden, but like Britain and the 
United States, France in the 1980s was motivated in its 
relationship with its banks primarily by ideology rather than 
pragmatism.  When Francois Mitterrand led the Socialist party 
to control of the French government in 1981, he nationalized 
banks as a matter of ideological preference rather than in 
response to a particular crisis.179  In fact, Mitterrand 
acknowledged that there was no purely economic justification 
for the nationalizations.180  They were instead, he said, a 
matter of principle, and that principle was embraced by French 
policymakers on the Left.181 
$V LQ WKH8QLWHG 6WDWHV EDVLQJ WKH QDWLRQ·V UHODWLRQVKLS
with its banking and financing industries on the basis of 
ideology was untenable for France in the face of economic 
crisis.182  France faced an acute economic crisis in the 1980s, in 
part because lending activity was driven by political, rather 
than economic, considerations.183  By the late 1980s, in a 
pragmatic response to the economic crisis, moVW RI )UDQFH·V
banking system had been de-­nationalized.184 
 
IV. An Attempt at Conclusion and Explanation 
 
Banking and housing are central to the life of any nation, 
and that is particularly so of the United States, where the idea 
of home-­ownership is central to its self-­image.  As such, they 
are too important to the economic life of a nation to be left 
captive to ideology.  Whether socialist or capitalist, societies 
pragmatically nationalize, de-­nationalize, and re-­nationalize in 
response to crises, then are swayed by ideology when they can 
 
179. See generally David Cobham, The Nationalisation of the Banks in 
0LWWHUDQG·V)UDQFH5DWLRQDOLVDWLRQVDQG5HDVRQV, 4 J. PUB. POL·Y 351 (1984). 
180. ALISTAIR COLE, FRANCOIS MITTERRAND: A STUDY IN POLITICAL 
LEADERSHIP 35 (1994). 
181. Id. at 33-­34. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. William L. Megginson, The Economics of Bank Privatization, 29 J. 
BANKING & FIN. 1931, 1964 (2005).  See generally id. GLVFXVVLQJ ´WKH
HPSLULFDOOLWHUDWXUHH[DPLQLQJEDQNSULYDWL]DWLRQµ 
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afford it.  Ideology, in other words, is a luxury.  It is a luxury 
that we have repeatedly paid for in the United States, and at 
great cost. 
Unfortunately, this cycle shows no signs of abating.  
Indeed, according to some commentators the question now is 
not whether to nationalize, but when to de-­nationalize.185  It 
would perhaps be wiser to adopt the pragmatic, non-­ideological 
approach modeled in Canada, rather than continuously reverse 
course in the face of crises.  If that happened, there might be 
fewer crises to face. 
 
 
 
185. Posting of Simon Johnson to The Baseline Scenario, 
http://baselinescenario.com/2009/02/23/privatize-­the-­banks-­already/ (Feb. 23, 
2009, 22:28). 
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